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FUTURE INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Convention) establishes
uniform jurisdictional rules for national courts in the ten Member States
of the European Economic Community' regarding disputes between
parties domiciled in different Member States. 2 The Convention sets
precise rules of jurisdiction binding the courts of all Member States in
disputes covered by the Convention. This in turn allows Member State
courts routinely to enforce judgments rendered by courts of other Member States because an enforcing court generally does not review the ren3
dering court's original jurisdiction.
Despite its overall clarity, certain key phrases in the Convention are
ambiguous, necessitating judicial interpretation. Thus, the Convention's signatories granted the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Court) the power to answer questions from certain Member
State courts regarding interpretation of the Convention.4 Interpretations by the European Court of Justice play an essential role in defining
the scope and meaning of certain of the Convention's articles.5 A
number of commentators have analyzed the Court's decisions under the
Convention, attempting to find a common theme and predict future
6
developments.
1 The ten member states are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
2 See Preamble, Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 299) 32 (1972), translated
in 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6003 [hereinafter cited as Convention on Jurisdiction].
3 Convention on Jurisdiction, arts. 26-49, supra note 2,
6030-53.
4 Protocol Concerning the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of
27 September 1968, on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, June 3, 1971, EEC Bulletin 7-1971, Supp. 4/71, translatedin 2 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 6082.
5 The Court's review of cases under the protocol's terms is similar to review under the
terms of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. See Kohler, The Case Law of the EuropeanJudgments
Convention, 1982 EUR. L. REv. 3, 4.
6 See, e.g., Byrne & Greaves, The Brussels Convention.- InterpretativeRulings onJurisdictional
Issues, 129 NEw L.J. 469, 588 (1979); Byrne & Greaves, The Brussel Convention onJurisdictionand
Judgments, 131 NEv L.J. 395, 529, 627 (1981); Droz, L'interpritation,par la Cour dejustice des
Communautes, des regles de comptencejudiciareeuropeennes en matiere de contrat, 1977 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY CHRONIQUES 287; Freeman, The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Civil and CommercialJudgments,3 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 496 (1981); Giardina, The European
Court and the Brussels Convention on JurisdictionandJudgments, 27 IrNr'L COMP. L.Q. 263 (1978).
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Article 17 of the Convention allows parties to a transaction to agree
as to which national court shall have jurisdiction should a dispute arise
out of their transaction. 7 Parties frequently use article 17 in commercial
dealings to specify jurisdiction, and it has generated a substantial
amount of litigation.8 Recent interpretations of article 17 by the Court
provide a useful focal point for evaluating commentators' analysis of the
Court's decisions pertaining to other portions of the Convention and
their predictions as to the Court's future actions. In particular, the
Court's interpretation of article 17 illustrates the reasoning behind the
alternate approaches available to the Court when construing specific
terms or phrases in the Convention and in community law in general.
Under the choice-of-law or national approach, the Court holds that the
term or phrase in question is to be interpreted according to the existing
law of each of the Member States. The Court indicates which individual Member State law should apply in a given situation. 9 Under the
independent approach, the Court establishes an independent rule or
body of rules governing the interpretation of the term or phrase in
question. 10

This Note analyzes the Court's interpretation of article 17 and
speculates on possible future developments. The first part of the Note
introduces the two interpretive methods the Court uses when resolving
ambiguities in the Convention's language: the choice-of-law approach
and the independent approach. The second part of the Note demonstrates that, despite the Court's decisions to date, the Court has not settled on an approach for interpreting article 17. The final part of the
Note argues that there are strong considerations favoring the use of existing individual Member State law, rather than the creation of independent rules, to interpret the term "agreement" in article 17.
Although an independent definition of agreement under the Convention
would help create uniform rules of jurisdiction throughout the European Economic Community, it would also involve the Court to an unprecedented extent in creating independent rules for the interpretation
of the Convention.
I
THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION

The Convention contains several terms found in the legal systems of
many or all of the Member States. However, these terms rarely have
identical meanings in each of the Member States. Courts then face the
7
article
8
9
10

Convention on Jurisdiction, art. 17, supra note 2,
17).
See infia note 83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.

6021; see a/so infra note 39 (quoting

1985]

EE. C CONVENTION ONJURISDICTION

question of how they should interpret such terms.II In some instances,
the Convention itself resolves the ambiguity by providing either an independent definition of the term or a method for determining which
Member State law should apply.' 2 In the majority of instances, however, the Court must resort to other means to decide between two or
more possible interpretations of the Convention's language.' 3 In such
circumstances, the Court must decide whether the article in question
should be interpreted in accordance with national law or under independent court-created rules.14
The national approach treats the article in question as a choice-oflaw document. Under this approach, the Court need not "produce
Community solutions to problems of interpretation, but instead, [need
only] indicate which national law applies."' 15 Member State courts then
apply existing definitions from national legal systems to terms in the
Convention. The Court thus establishes a rule governing which Mem16
ber State's substantive law should apply in a specific situation.
t

The Court has defined the problem:

The Convention frequently uses words and legal concepts drawn from civil,
commercial and procedural law and capable of a different meaning from one
Contracting State to another. The question therefore arises whether these
words and concepts must be regarded as having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to all the Contracting States or as referring to
substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the rules of conflict
of laws of the court before which the matter is first brought.
Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183, 2190, [1979] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 490, 501-02.
12 Article 25 of the Convention, for example, defines the term "judgment" independently of the definition of any of the Member States.
For the purposes of this Convention 'judgment" means any judgment
given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State, whatever the judgment
may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well
as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.
Convention on Jurisdiction, art 25. supra note 2, 1 6029. Article 52, by contrast, provides that
the term "domiciled," as used in article 2 of the Convention, shall be defined in accordance
with the domestic law of "the Contracting State whose courts are seised of a matter." Convention on Jurisdiction, art. 52, supra note 2, 6056. Likewise, article 53 states that a national
court should determine the "seat" of a company or other legal association under "its rules of
private international law." Convention on Jurisdiction, art. 53, supra note 2, 1 6057; see
Kohler, supra note 5, at 7-8.
13 Terms that are not defined in the Convention, but that appear frequently in litigation
before the Court ofJustice, include article 1 ("civil and commercial matters"), Convention on
Jurisdiction, supra note 2, 1 6005; article 5(1) ("place of performance of the obligation in
question'), id 6009; article 5(5) ("place in which the branch, agency or other establishment
is situated), id. T 6009; article 13(1) ("sale of goods on installment credit terms"), id 1 6017;
article 16 (exclusive jurisdiction), id $ 6020; article 17 ("agreement . . . in writing or evidenced in writing"), id. T 6021; and article 18 ("defendant enters an appearance"), id. 1 6022.
14 See Herzog, supranote 6, at 427; Kohler, supra note 5, at 8; see also Giardina, supra note
6, at 265.
15
Freeman, supra note 6, at 504.
16
A national court will not always apply its own substantive law in interpreting an
article of the Convention. One option available to the Court of Justice is to instruct national
courts to apply the "substantive" law of the Member State that would govern "under the
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Whatever solution the Court adopts, national courts ultimately use the
existing domestic substantive law of one of the Member States to inter17
pret the article in question.
In contrast, under the "independent" approach, the Court actively
creates a body of substantive law to govern the interpretation of certain
of the Convention's articles. The Court has determined that certain
terms "must be regarded as having their own independent meaning and
as being thus common to all the Member States."' 8 The Court thus
creates uniform Community law, 19 binding on the national courts, for
the interpretation of articles to which it applies the independent
20
approach.
Court decisions have followed either the choice-of-law or the in2
dependent approach, depending on the term requiring interpretation. '
The Court first faced the problem of choosing between the two approaches in Tessiliv. Dunlop.22 The Court in Tessiliopted for a choice-ofrules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is first brought." See Industrie
Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, 1484, [1977] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 26, 52-53.
17
The Convention was silent, for example, as to what law should be used in interpreting
the phrase "place of performance of the obligation" in article 5(1). In a series of decisions, the
Court held that this phrase should be interpreted under national law.
The "place of performance of the obligation in question" within the meaning
of Article 5(1) of the Convention. . . is to be determined in accordance with
the [substantive national] law which governs . . . according to the rules of
conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is brought.
Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1486, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 53. The
Court reached a similar result in holding that "defence" in article 18 refers to "the submissions which under national procedural law are considered to be the first defence" addressed to
the Court. Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671, 1686,
[1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 20.
18 Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1484, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
51-52.
19 Freeman, supra note 6, at 505.
20 Where the Convention does not explicitly define a term, the Court has frequently
interpreted the term independently of national law. In LTU Lufttransportunternehmen
GmbH v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1541, 1551 [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 88,
100, for example, the Court stated that the term "civil and commercial matters" in article I
"cannot be interpreted solely in the light of the division of jurisdiction between the various
types of courts existing in certain States" but rather "must. . . be regarded as independent."
The Court has also created independent law regarding the interpretation of articles 5(3),
Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d' Alsace SA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1735, 1748, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283, 301 (the term "place where the harmful event
occurred" includes "the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event giving rise
to it"); article 5(5), Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183, 2193,
[1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490, 504 ("branch, agency or other establishment" constitutes
place of business with the appearance of permanency, a management, and the ability to negotiate business with third parties); and article 13, Soci~t6 Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, 1978 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1431, 1447, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 499, 510 ("sale of goods on installment credit terms" does not include sales paid by bills of exchange spread over a period).
21 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
22 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473,
[1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26. Tssili involved a suit by a German firm against an Italian
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law approach to define the term "place of performance of the obligation" in article 5(1). The Court ruled that the term must be interpreted
"inaccordance with the [Member State] law" applicable under "the
rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is
brought. '23 More significantly, however, with respect to the Convention as a whole, the Court stated that it will not prefer one approach
over the other; the Court will choose between the choice-of-law approach and the independent approach individually for each term that
24
requires definition.
A number of commentators have nevertheless claimed to identify a
trend in the Court's decisions since 1976 towards the independent approach.2 5 One commentator has even suggested that the Court might
abandon its holding in Tessili and fashion an independent definition of
the article 5(1) term "place of performance of the obligation in ques26
tion" if confronted with the issue today.
Christian Kohler has argued, however, that even though the Court
has recently adopted the independent approach more frequently than it
has the national approach, it must still choose between the two methods
when interpreting a term for the first time.2 7 According to Kohler, the
Court cannot apply either rule of interpretation "indiscriminantly" to
all ambiguous terms in the Convention, but must "differentiate according to the nature and the position in the general structure of the Conmanufacturer in the Landesgericht [trial court], Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany, alleging breach of a contract to supply women's ski suits of a specified standard. The Oberlandesgericht [court of appeals] referred to the Court of Justice the question of whether a
Member State court could apply national law in determining the "place of performance of
the obligation" for purposes of article 5(1) of the Convention.
23 Id at 1486, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 53. Compare Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
987, 1002, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 605, 619 ("the concept of matters relating to a contract" in article 5(1) should not be interpreted by referring to the national law of a Member
State, but rather must be interpreted independently).
24 Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1485, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
52. "Neither of [the] two options rules out the other since the appropriate choice can only be
made in respect of each of the provisions of the Convention
Id at 1485, [1977] 1
Id.."
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 52.
25 For example, Freeman stated, "[s]ince Tessiliv. Dunlop. . .the Court has in a number
of cases favored the approach of adopting a community solution." Freeman, supra note 6, at
504. She further claimed that the Court "pursues a definite policy in its interpretation of the
Convention, . . . based upon a desire for uniformity in the application of the Convention. . . . [T]he Court's policy emphasizes its role. . . as the ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of the Convention." Id at 515-16.
26 "If the Tssili question were to be put to the Court today, there is a good chance that
the Court would give a Community definition to the expression 'place of performance' rather
than return the question to the national courts and their traditional rules of conflict of laws."
Recent Development, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 449, 460 (1980).
27
"[The Court] has . . .never ruled that the terms used in the Convention but not
classified therein, must, where doubt arises, be interpreted independently and only in exceptional cases be understood as a reference to a particular national legal system." Kohler, supra
note 5, at 11.
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vention of the provisions in which the terms are used." 28 Kohler thus
29
implied that the Court still follows the reasoning set forth in Tessilz;
and selects its approach "separately in respect of each provision and
' 30

each term."

A recent decision supports the argument that the Court is unwilling
to abandon the approach set forth in TessiAz In Effr v. Kantner3 l a patent agent in the Federal Republic of Germany attempted to invoke the
jurisdiction of a court in the Federal Republic of Germany over Effer, a
crane manufacturer located in Italy. Kantner, the patent agent, relied
on a contract between himself and Hydraulikkran, Effer's distributor in
Germany, to invoke the court's jurisdiction over Effer under article 5(1)
of the Convention. Effer contested jurisdiction on the ground that it
had no contract with Kantner. The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court
of Justice) referred the following question to the Court for a preliminary
ruling: "May the plaintiff invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of the
place of performance in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Convention
even when the existence of the contract on which the claim is based is in
dispute between the parties?" 3 2 The Court ruled that the patent agent
could invoke the jurisdiction of the court of the place of performance
despite a dispute between the parties over the existence of the contract
on which the claim was based. 33 The Court stated:
[T]he national court's jurisdiction to determine questions relating to a
contract includes the power to consider the existence of the constituent parts of the contract itself.

. .

. [T]he court called upon to decide

a dispute arising out of a contract may examine, of its own motion
even,.

.

evidence.

the contract.

34

. .

establishing the existence or the inexistence of

The Court's ruling in EJfer did not, however, address the issue of
what law Member States should apply when attempting to ascertain the
existence of a contract. Neither the Convention nor the Court's decisions identify the necessary elements of a contract for the purposes of the
Convention. A body of independent community law relating to contracts does not presently exist. 35 Nor did the Court in Efer attempt to
define the necessary elements of a contract for jurisdictional purposes
28
29

Id.
Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26.

30
31
667.
32
33

Kohler, supra note 5, at 11.
Effer SpA. v. Kantner, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.

34
35

Id. at 834, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 675.
The closest body of relevant Community law consists of the proposed Convention on

Id. at 833, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 674.
Id at 835-36, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 676.

6311
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
(opened for signature on June 19, 1980). This convention contains choice of law provisions
establishing rules as to which Member State law shall govern the interpretation of contracts.
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under the Convention. Because a court "determine[s] questions relating
to a contract" under national law, it follows that national law governs
determination of whether a contract exists. 36 This result is consistent
with the proposed Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, under which the existence and validity of a contract are
37
determined by Member State law.

The Court in E fr did not produce a broad, clear assertion that it
would use the choice-of-law approach rather than the independent approach to determine the existence of a contract under article 5(l); the
Court did not explicitly state that national courts should apply national
law rather than an independent body of rules promulgated by the Court
in determining whether a contract exists. 38 The result nevertheless
proves significant as an indication that the Court has not abandoned the
use of national law by Member State courts in interpreting certain provisions of the Convention. The approach outlined in Tessili v. Dunlop,
whereby the Court makes a determination of which approach to follow
based on the individual article and phrase in question, appears to remain valid.
II
ARTICLE 17-INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT

Article 1739 of the Convention on Jurisdiction allows parties to conIt does not establish independent Community rules concerning the existence, validity, or interpretation of contracts.
36 Effer v. Kantner, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 834, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
675. Advocate General Reischl and the United Kingdom also recognized that "the examination of the question ofjurisdiction [would] wholly or partly overlap. . . with the examination
of the substance of the claim." Id. at 839, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 672. This overlap
would exist only if the Court's review, for purposes ofjurisdiction, of the factors surrounding
the formation of the alleged contract was conducted under the same law as the review of the
contract itself, namely national law.
37 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, arts. 8 & 9, 2
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11 6320, 6321 (opened for signature of June 19, 1980).
38 None of the opinions presented before the Court argued that it should create an independent definition of the term "contract" for purposes ofjurisdiction under article 5(1) of
the Convention. The two parties, the United Kingdom (which intervened to present an opinion before the Court), the Commission of European Communities, and Advocate General
Reischl all assumed that if courts were to determine the existence or nonexistence of a contract for purposes of jurisdiction, they would do so in accordance with national law. The
question in Effer was not what law the national courts would use in deciding if a contract
existed for purposes ofjurisdiction, but instead whether the national courts should even make
such a determination strictly for the purposes of jurisdiction.
Summaries of the parties' arguments are printed at 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 827-28, 3
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8820, at 7708-09. For the observations of the United Kingdom see id. at 828-30, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8820, at 7709-11, and for those of the
Commission of the European Communities, see id. at 830-82, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8820, at 7711-12. For the full text of the opinion of the Advocate General, see id. at 836-40,
[1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 669-73.
39 Article 17 reads:
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fer jurisdiction on the courts of a Member State by agreement. Agreements to confer jurisdiction override all other bases of jurisdiction,
except in those matters in which a court has exclusive jurisdiction under
article 16. 4 0 If a party agrees to confer jurisdiction on a particular court,
that party loses the safeguards provided in other articles of the Convention. Article 17 therefore provides certain requirements of form to protect unwary parties entering such agreements. It requires agreements
conferring jurisdiction to be "in writing or evidenced in writing or...
41
in a form which accords with practices in that trade or commerce."
Article 17 contains no other formal requirements for agreements conferring jurisdiction, nor does it define the substantive elements of such
agreements.
The Court has interpreted article 17 in a number of cases. 42 The
scope of these decisions, however, has been limited. 43 In particular, the
Court has had few opportunities to define the term "agreement." Despite the Court's past tendency to interpret article 17 using the independent approach, 44 certain factors could cause the Court to
reconsider its approach if faced with the problem of defining the term
"agreement."'45
A.

The Requirement of a Writing
Most of the Court decisions interpreting article 17 have focused on
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State,
have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall
have exclusive jurisdiction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall
be either in writing or evidenced in writing or in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with practices in that trade or commerce of
which the parties are or ought to have been aware. Where such an agreement
is concluded by parties, none of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, the
courts of other Contracting States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction.

Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction
shall have no legal force if they are contrary to the provisions of Article 12 or
15, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16.
If an agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of
only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings
in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention.
Convention on Jurisdiction, art. 17, supra note 2, $ 6021.
40
Agreements conferring jurisdiction in matters relating to certain insurance or commercial contracts, however, must comply with the conditions set forth in articles 12 and 15
respectively. Id.
41
Id
42
See infia notes 46-82 and accompanying text.
43
See infta notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
44
See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
45
See infla section III.
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the article's formal requirements for an agreement.4 6 The Court's opinions have particularly concentrated on the requirement that the agreement be in writing. The Court first interpreted article 17 in two
decisions handed down on the same day. The opinions concerned the
requirement that an agreement conferring jurisdiction be "in writing or
evidenced in writing. ' 47 In the first case, Colzani v. RC'WA Polstereimaschinen,48 a German machine supplier brought suit against an Italian
firm in the Landgericht K6ln pursuant to a jurisdiction clause printed
on the back of a signed contract. The Court addressed two questions:
"[W]hether a clause conferring jurisdiction, which is included among
general conditions of sale printed on the back of a contract signed by
49
both parties, fulfills the requirement of a writing" under article 17,
and whether an express reference "in the contract to a prior offer in
writing in which reference was made to general conditions of sale including a clause conferring jurisdiction" fulfills the same writing requirement.5 0 The Court adopted an independent rather than a choiceof-law approach to answer these questions. The Court looked primarily
to the writing requirement's purpose of ensuring that the clause conferring jurisdiction was the result of a true consensus between the parties in
reaching its decision. 5 ' The Court thus held that a clause conferring
jurisdiction, printed on the back of a contract among general conditions
of sale, fulfills the requirements of article 17 only if the contract itself
contains an express reference to those conditions.5 2 If the contract refers
to earlier offers, which in turn refer to the general conditions of sale, the
requirement of a writing under article 17 is met "only if the reference is
express and can therefore be checked by a party exercising reasonable
46 The one exception is Meeth v. Glacetal, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2133, [1979] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 520. Glacetalinvolved a suit for nonpayment for deliveries by Glacetal, a
French glass supplier, against Meeth, a German window manufacturer, before the Landgericht Trier, Federal Republic of Germany. Glacetal brought suit pursuant to an agreement between the firms that either party could be sued by the other only in its place of
domicile. Meeth asserted a defense of set-off, alleging damages from delay or default on
Glacetal's part in deliveries due under their contract. The European Court of Justice was
faced with two questions: first, whether such an agreement was valid, and second, if the
agreement was valid, whether the defendant could raise a defense of set-off in a court other
than the court in which it could have brought suit against the plaintiff under the agreement's
terms. The Court ruled that article 17 allows an agreement "under which the two parties to a
contract for sale, who are domiciled in different States, can be sued only in the courts of their
respective States." Id. at 2143, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 531. Such an agreement does
not, however, prevent the court hearing the dispute "from taking into account a set-off connected with the legal relationship in dispute." Id. at 2144, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 531.
47
Convention on Jurisdiction, art. 17, supra note 2, 6021.
48
Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani v. RUWA Polstereimaschinen
GmbH, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345.
49 Id. at 1841, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 355.
50 Id. at 1842, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 356.
51 Id. at 1841, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 355.
52 Id. at 1842, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 356.
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53

care."
The Court further defined the article 17 requirement of a writing in
Segoura v. Bonakdarian.54 Segoura involved an oral contract between the
parties for the sale of carpets. One of the parties confirmed the contract
with a written "Order and Invoice" after partial performance. The
"Order and Invoice" included a clause among the conditions of sale and
delivery on the reverse side conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the
courts of Hamburg. The Court considered whether article 17's requirement of a writing is satisfied if one party to an oral contract confirms in
writing to the other party the conclusion of the contract subject to attached conditions of sale, including a clause conferring jurisdiction, and
the receiving party does not object to the written confirmation. 55 In
making its decision, the Court again followed the independent approach
and looked to the purpose of the writing requirement to resolve the issue. 56 The Court held that the requirements of article 17 "as to form are
satisfied only if the vendor's confirmation in writing accompanied by
notification of the general conditions of sale has been accepted in writing by the purchaser. '5 7 Failure by the purchaser to object to the conditions in the other party's unilateral confirmation notice "does not
amount to acceptance . . . of the clause conferring jurisdiction, unless
the oral agreement comes within the framework of a continuing trading
relationship between the parties." 58
The Court's decisions in Colzani and Segoura set the tone of subsequent interpretations of article 17.59 In both cases, the Court placed a
Id at 1843, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 356.
Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Rahim Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1851,
[1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 361.
55
In Segoura, the Bundesgerichtshof referred two questions to the Court. They read:
1. Are the requirements of Article 17 of the Convention satisified if, at the
oral conclusion of a contract of sale, a vendor has stated that he wishes to rely
on his general conditions of sale and if he subsequently confirms the contract
in writing to the purchaser and annexes to this confirmation his general conditions of sale which contain a clause conferring jurisdiction?
2. Are the requirements of Article 17 of the Convention satisfied if, in dealings between merchants, a vendor, after the oral conclusion of a contract of
sale, confirms in writing to the purchaser the conclusion of the contract subject to his general conditions of sale and annexes to this document his conditions of sale which include a clause conferring jurisdiction and if the
purchaser does not challenge this written confirmation?
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1854, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 363. The court determined, however, that the two questions actually raised only one issue, and that it was "possible to give a single answer to the two questions referred to the Court." Id.at 1862, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 372.
56 Id at 1860, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 368; seealsosupranote51and accompanying
text (describing the purpose underlying the writing requirement).
57
Id at 1863, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 372.
58
Id, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 372.
59 The Court has applied its reasoning in Colzani to answer questions relating to multiparty contracts. In Colzant, the Court stated that the purpose of the article 17 requirement of
53

54
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duty on the national court to examine "whether the clause conferring
jurisdiction upon it was in fact the subject of a consensus between the
parties, which must be clearly and precisely demonstrated." 60 In determining whether an agreement satisfies the requirement of a writing
under article 17, however, the national courts must adhere to standards
created by the Court, rather than applying national law standards de' 61
fining an agreement "in writing or evidenced in writing.
B.

Other Requirements of Form

The Court has more recently addressed requirements of form of
article 17 other than the requirement of a writing. In its recent decisions, the Court has mainly confronted questions relating to the extent
to which requirements of form established by individual Member States
for agreements conferring jurisdiction apply to agreements conferring
jurisdiction under article 17.62 The Court first confronted a direct conflict between national law and article 17 in Sanicentral v. Collin.63 This
case arose from the breach of a contract signed in October 1971 between
a German firm and a French worker. The contract contained a clause
a writing is to ensure actual consent of the parties to the agreement conferring jurisdiction. In
a recent decision, the Court faced the issue of whether a third party beneficiary to a contract
was required to manifest assent in writing to a clause conferring jurisdiction. Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs AG v. Amministrazione del Tesoro dello Stato, 1983 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2503, involved an insurance contract between Gerling, representing an
international group of insurers, and the International Road Transport Union, on behalf of
itself and a number of national associations. The contract provided that, should a dispute
arise between the pool of insurers and a national association, the courts of the country of the
national association would have jurisdiction.
Subsequently, a dispute arose concerning penalties, taxes, and duties unlawfully levied in
Italy by the Italian national association on transport activities. The Ministry of the Treasury
of Italy filed suit against Gerling in the Tribunale di Roma [District Court of Rome]; Gerling
challenged the court's jurisdiction on the ground that the national association of Italy had not
assented to the agreement to confer jurisdiction in writing.
The Court ruled that a third party beneficiary to an insurance contract could rely on a
clause in a contract conferringjurisdiction even if the beneficiary had not expressly signed the
clause, provided that the insurer and the policy holder satisfied the requirements of article
17. Id. at 2518. The court implied that the central purpose of article 17 is to ensure that the
party relinquishing the protections set forth in other articles of the Convention actually consented to the agreement conferring jurisdiction. The beneficiary of the agreement does not
require this same protection. Id. at 2516-17.
60 Segoura v. Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1851, 1860, [1977] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 361, 371; Colzani v. RUWA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831, 1841, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345, 355.
61 See Colzani v. ROWA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831, 1842, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 345, 356; Segoura v. Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1851, 1862, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 361, 372.
62 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1671, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 1; Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 164.
63 Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 164.
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conferring jurisdiction on the local German court, but in 1973 the
French worker brought suit in the Tribunal d'Instance, Molsheim,
France. The Tribunal held that it could properly assume jurisdiction,
because the Convention was not in force at the time the contract was
signed 64 and the French Civil and Labor Codes prohibited choice of
jurisdiction in employment contracts. On appeal, the Cour de Cassation referred to the Court the question whether "clauses conferring jurisdiction . . . which would have been regarded as void by the internal

legislation in force at that time" should be deemed valid if the proceeding is brought after February 1, 1973.65 The Court answered the question in the affirmative.6 6 More important than the Court's holding,
however, was its implication that article 17 displaced national laws reg67
ulating certain types of agreements conferring jurisdiction.
The Court extended the implications of its Sanicentraldecision in
Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain.68 In Elefanten Schuh, the Court indicated that
a Member State may not impose formal requirements for an agreement
conferring jurisdiction contrary to or more rigorous than those set out in
article 17.69
The litigation in Elefanten Schuh arose from a 1970 employment contract between Mr. Jacqmain and the German firm Elefanten Schuh
GmbH. Elefanten Schuh's Belgian subsidiary employed Jacqmain as a
sales agent in Belgium. The employment contract, however, conferred
exclusive jurisdiction on the court at Kleve, Federal Republic of Germany. In 1975 the firm dismissed Jacqmain, and Jacqmain sued Elefanten Schuh GmbH and its Belgian subsidiary in the Arbeidsrechtbank
Antwerp (Labor Tribunal, Antwerp, Belgium). 70 The defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction on the basis of the contract's exclusive
jurisdiction clause. The Arbeidsrechtbank and the Arbeidshof Antwerp,
64
65

The Convention came into force on February 1, 1973.
Sanicentral v. Collin, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 3429, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 172-73.
66 The Court stated:
Articles 17 and 54 of the Convention. . . must be interpreted to mean that,
in judicial proceedings instituted after the coming into force of the Convention, clauses conferring jurisdiction included in contracts of employment concluded prior to that date must be considered valid even in cases in which they
would have been regarded as void under the national law in force at the time
when the contract was entered into.
Id at 3431, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 174.
67 See id. at 3429, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 173; see also Kohler, supra note 5, at 109"
("Article 17 is intended to lay down itself the formal requirements which agreements conferring jurisduction must meet").
68 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1671, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 1.
69 See id. at 1688, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 21; Kohler, supra note 5, at 108 n.84,
109.
70 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1673, [1982] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 3.
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to which the defendants appealed, rejected their defense. Applying Belgian law that required contracts to be written in Dutch, 7' the Arbeidshof invalidated the German language employment contract and,
thereby, invalidated its clause conferring jurisdiction. 72 The German
defendant appealed the decision to the Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation), which in turn referred three questions to the Court. 73 Regarding article 17, the Hof van Cassatie posed the following question:
Does it conflict with Article 17 of the Convention to rule that an
agreement conferring jurisdiction on a court is void if the document in
which the agreement is contained is not drawn up in the language
which is prescribed by the law of a contracting State upon a penalty
of nullity and if the court of the State before which the agreement is
relied upon is bound by that law to declare the document to be void
74
of its own motion?
The advocate general 75 argued that the Court should rule that a
Member State court may declare an agreement invalid if it fails to comply with the laws of a Member State, even if the agreement conforms to
the requirements set out in article 17. He argued, however, that the
Member State court should not look to its own law in considering the
validity of the contract, but to the law of the forum state referred to by
the agreement. 76 The advocate general reasoned that conditions specifically "prescribed in the Convention

. .

. must be interpreted indepen-

dently of any particular national law" but, where the Convention was
silent, national requirements remained valid and binding.77 Because ar71 Article 52(1) of the Royal Decree of 18 July 1966 and Articles 5 and 10 of the Royal
Decree of 19 July 1973 provided that all employers of persons working in the Dutch-speaking
areas of Belgium must use the Dutch language in all documents addressed to such persons,
and that any document deviating from this requirement would be null and void. See Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1674, 1691-92, [1982] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 3-4, 8.
72 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671, 1674, [1982] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 4.
73 Id at 1676-77, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 6. Two of the questions did not relate to
article 17. Id, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 6.
74 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1687, [1982] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 20.
75 The Court of Justice of the European Communities includes, in addition to the 11
judges, five advocates general. One advocate general is assigned to each case that comes
before the Court. The advocate general issues an advisory opinion to the court following the
close of argument and before the Court begins its deliberations. Although the Court frequently follows the opinion of the advocate general, the Court is by no means bound to do so.
The opinion of the advocate general is published along with that of the Court. The Court
does not publish dissenting opinions; in cases where the Court does not follow the opinion of
the advocate general, therefore, the advocate general's opinion serves as a type of dissenting
opinion. For a more detailed discussion, see L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OFJUSTIcE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 54-69 (1983).

76 Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1697-99, [1982] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 13-15.
77 Id at 1697, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 13.
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ticle 17 did not address the issue of the language of agreements conferring jurisdiction, the question became one of "which national law
decides those other requirements as to whether there is a valid agreement. 78 He suggested that the law of the forum named in the writing
79
should govern the solution to this problem.
The Court, however, refused to follow the advocate general's suggested approach, and looked instead to the intent of article 17's draftsmen. 0 The Court found that the draftsmen intended the article itself to
set out the "formal requirements" for agreements conferring jurisdiction
and concluded that Member States "are not free to lay down formal
requirements other than those contained in the Convention."' Applying this principle to the issue of language requirements, the Court held
that Member States could not pass legislation invalidating agreements
conferring jurisdiction "solely on the ground that the language used is
'8 2
not that prescribed by [the national] legislation.
C.

Substantive Aspects of Agreements Conferring Jurisdiction

A survey of the Court's decisions thus shows that the Court has
consistently selected the independent, rather than the choice-of-law, approach when interpreting article 17. In each of the six decisions interpreting article 17's requirements of fonn, 83 the Court has eschewed
national law concepts and created new, uniform law. It would be preId. at 1697, [19821 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 14.
Id. at 1698, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 15.
See id. at 1687-88, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 20-22.
81 Id. at 1688, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 21.
82 Id at 1690, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 21.
83 Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs AG v. Amministrazione del Tesoro
dello Stato, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2053 (discussed supra note 59); Elefanten Schuh v.
Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (discussed supra
notes 68-82 and accompanying text); Sanicentral v. Collin, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423,
[1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 164 (discussed supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text); Meeth v.
Glacetal, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2133, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 520 (discussed supra
note 46); Segoura v. Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1851, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 361 (discussed supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text); Cozani v. R10WA, 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345 (discussed supra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text). Although the Court has addressed article 17 in Porta-Leasing GmbH v.
Prestige Int'l SA, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1517, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 135, and
Zelger v. Salinitri, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 89, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 635, the Court's
holdings in these two cases were based on other articles of the Convention. In Porla-Leasing
the Court rested its decision on the special provisions listed in article 1 of the Protocol to the'
Convention. These provisions deal with agreements that confer jurisdiction, a party to which
is a domiciliary of Luxembourg. The Court held that a clause conferring jurisdiction within a
contract that was signed by both parties was not sufficient to meet the special requirements
set forth in the Protocol. Porta-Leasing, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1523-25, [1981] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 140-41. Zelger involved an interpretation of article 5(1). In Ze/ger the
Court distinguished article 5(1) from article 17 when it held that an agreement as to the place
of performance of a contractual obligation did not have to meet the formal conditions set
forth in article 17. 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 96-97, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 642-43.
78

79
80
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mature to conclude, however, that the Court has decided that it should
interpret article 17's substantive aspects independently of national law.
A more careful examination of the decisions interpreting article 17
reveals that the Court has restricted its considerations to the requirements of form article 17 places on agreements to confer jurisdiction.
The Court has not spoken to the issue of what constitutes an agreement
under article 17. In Colzani84 and Segoura v. Bonakdarian,8 5 the Court
interpreted the requirement expressly stated in article 17 that an agreement conferring jurisdiction be "in writing or evidenced in writing."8 6
Although the Court's reasoning in these two cases may have wider significance, the Court has strictly limited its holdings to an interpretation
87
of this ruling in Segoura to article 17's requirements "as to form."1
The Court in Sanicenlra18 8 and Elefanten Schuh 89 confronted questions that did not implicate article 17's requirement of writing.9° Both
opinions, nevertheless, apply solely to formal requirements and do not
address the issue of substantive requirements, such as what elements an
agreement to confer jurisdiction must contain. In Sanicentralthe Court
stated that the Convention superseded national "procedural" laws relating to jurisdiction.9t This reasoning suggested that national nonprocedural laws remain valid, even when related to jurisdiction. 92 In
Elefanten Schuh the Court held that article 17 overruled Member State
laws regarding formal requirements for agreement conferring jurisdiction. 93 At least one expert believes that the Court intended to limit its
decision in Elefanten Schuh so as not to reach the issue of whether Mem84
85
361.
86
87
L.R. at
88
164.
89

Colzani v. ROWA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1831, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345.
Segoura v. Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1851, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
Segoura v. Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1863, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt.
373.
Sanicentral v. Collin, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
Elefanten Schuh v.Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt.

L.R. 1.
90 See supra notes 62-82.
91 The Court stated: "[T]he national procedurallaws applicable to [matters of civil jurisdiction] are set aside in the matters governed by the Convention in favour of the provisions
[thereof]." Sanicentral v. Collins, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3429, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 173 (emphasis added).
92
The Court did not define precisely what matters article 17 covers, nor did it state
what matters national laws still govern. The logical inference, however, is that national substantive laws remain vali8d, even when applied to jurisdictional matters under the
Convention.
93
1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1688, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 21. In Elefanten
Schuk, the Court elaborated on the matters article 17 governs. The Court was careful, however, to confine its discussion to theforma/requirements for an agreement conferring jurisdiction. "Article 17 is thus intended to lay down itself theforma/requirements which agreements
conferring jurisdiction must meet. . . Consequently Contracting States are not free to lay
downforma/ requirements other than those contained in the Convention." Id. at 1688, [1982]
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ber States may validly apply national substantive laws to agreements
94

conferring jurisdiction.
The Court's decisions interpreting article 17 to date thus do not
bear on substantive requirements for agreements conferring jurisdiction.
The Court's decisions therefore do not answer the questions of how an
agreement is defined under article 17 or what law the courts should apply in determining whether the parties actually formed an agreement.
The Court has not addressed issues relating to the ability of a Member
State to regulate nonformal aspects of agreements conferring
jurisdiction. 95
Because the Court has not yet interpreted article 17's substantive
aspects, the Court's past decisions, which adopt the independent approach to interpret the article's formal requirements, do not authoritatively demonstrate that the Court will adopt the independent approach
when dealing with substantive problems such as the criteria governing
the term "agreement" in article 17. Thus, in order to predict which
approach the court will select to define the term "agreement," one must
3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 21 (emphasis added). The Court's discussion had no bearing on
nonformal or substantive requirements of an agreement conferring jurisdiction.
94 Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn stressed the Court's repeated emphasis on formal
requirements in expressing his opinion that the Court intended to limit the reach of its decision. Interview with Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Sept. 9, 1983).
95
The Court's failure to address the issues of a Member State's ability to regulate agreements conferring jurisdiction, and the extent to which they may do so, does not result from a
basic assumption that article 17 prohibits Member States from regulating any aspects of such
agreements. Indeed, advocates general of the Court have maintained that the Member States
retain power to regulate aspects of agreements conferring jurisdiction that article 17 does not
address. Mr. Capotorti, for example, has written:
[T]he question legitimately arises whether the substantive aspects of the
agreement assigning jurisdiction are to be deduced from Article 17, interpreted by itself, or whether these aspects ought not rather to be left for determination under the law of the different States ....
[In so far as such
requirements, whether relating to substance or to form, have been laid down
by the Convention as conditions precedent for the formalities required by the
Convention to be fulfilled, an independent interpretation must be found on
the basis of the logic and wording of the Convention. All this is, of course,
without prejudice to national requirements in other respects, whether of form
or of substance, which do not come within the ambit of the Convention rules
subject to Community interpretation.
Segoura v. Bonakdarian, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1851, 1867-68, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 361, 368. Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General of the Court, cited the last sentence of
Mr. Capotorti's statement with approval in Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1671, 1697, [19821 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 13-14. The Court held in Elefanten Schuh
that article 17 was intended to set out all "formal requirements" for an agreement, and that
Member States could not impose any additional "formal requirements." 1981 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. at 1688, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 21. The Court's restriction on Member States'
power to regulate the form of agreements conferring jurisdiction partially overruled Mr.
Capotorti's statement that the Convention does not prohibit national regulation "of form or
of substance" of agreements in respects not covered by the Convention. The Court has yet to
rule on the degree to which Member States may regulate the substance of agreements conferring jurisdiction.
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analyze the reasons why the Court selects one approach over the other
in certain situations.
III
FUTURE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE

17

Although the Court has confronted the problem of selecting the
independent or the choice-of-law approach in interpreting various
clauses of the Convention, it has yet to identify a formula it follows to
reach its results. The Court's decisions, however, reflect a number of
factors that it considers in making this selection. These factors include
the Convention's general policy and purposes, the degree to which the
laws of individual Member States similarly define the term in question,
and the role of the particular article within the Convention as a whole.
The Court has not identified the manner in which it relates these factors
to one another, but one commentator has suggested that the Court implicitly balances them in order to reach its decisions. 96
Additional considerations, not yet expressly recognized by the
Court, probably influence its selection of either the independent approach or the choice-of-law approach. These considerations include the
Court's lack of authority to create new bodies of law and the practical
difficulties associated with defining broad legal terms on a case by case
basis. 9 7 Because of the complexity inherent in these additional factors
and the Court's limited explanation for past decisions, it is impossible to
predict with certainty the approach the Court will adopt to interpret the
term "agreement" in article 17.
A.

Factors Expressly Considered by the Court

In its previous decisions, the Court has identified three factors it
considers when selecting the independent approach or the choice-of-law
approach to interpret a particular clause in the Convention. The Court
first considers the Convention's general policies and purposes taken as a
whole. The Court has held, for example, that article 5(1) may only be
interpreted "within the framework of the system of conferment of jurisdiction" of the Convention as a whole. 98 The Court concluded that arti96 Set Kohler, supra note 5, at 12; inra note 115 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
98 Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, 1485, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
26, 52. If the Court selects an independent method of interpretation, then it must confront
the closely related problem of defining the term at issue. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 12-13.
The Court has noted that, for purposes of definition, a term must also "be interpreted by
reference. . . to the objectives and scheme of the Convention" as a whole. LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, 1551, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 88, 100-01 (an action between an individual and a public authority is
outside the "civil and commercial matters" to which the Convention applies); see also
Gourdain v. Nadler, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 733, 743, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 180, 196
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cle 5(1) must be interpreted under national law. 99 In using the
independent approach to interpret article 5(5), the Court concluded
that it had selected the method that would "ensure that the Convention
10 0
is fully effective in achieving the objectives which it pursues."
The Court has emphasized two general purposes of the Convention:
the avoidance of unnecessary procedure, and the promotion of uniform
jurisdictional law among the Member States.10 ' The Court has occasionally cited the need to avoid superfluous procedure as the basis for
selecting either the choice-of-law approach or the independent ap10 3
proach. 102 It is rarely, however, a determinative factor.
The second purpose of the Convention, uniformity, requires that,
whenever possible, jurisdictional rules under the Convention not differ
among the Member States. 104 If the Court were to interpret the term
"agreement" contained in article 17 of the Convention under the choiceof-law approach, then a combination of Convention law and national
law would govern jurisdiction. Discrepancies in the jurisdiction of
Member State courts could result from the different interpretations
Member State law might give the term. If the Court gave the term
"agreement" an independent definition, however, national courts would
use only community law in determining jurisdiction, and different interpretations of the term by Member States would not affect

(the Convention does not apply to a French civil court decision given in the context of
" 'bankruptcy proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent companies. . . and analogous proceedings' ").
99 Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1485, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
53.
100
Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183, 2190, [1977] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490, 502 (the term "branch, agency or other establishment" in article 5(5)
means a place of business with an appearance of permanency, a management, and the ability
to negotiate business with third parties).
101
See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
102
See, e.g., Meeth v. Glacetal, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2133, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 520 (allowing a defendant to bring a counterclaim in a court other than that in which he
was entitled to bring suit under the agreement, in order to avoid two separate concurrent
suits). In Meeth, the Court stated that questions arising under article 17 "must be determined
with regard [to] the need to avoid superfluous procedure, which forms the basis of the Convention as a whole." Id.at 2142, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 530. This consideration was a
persuasive reason for the Court to adopt an independent approach to the term "a contracting
state" in article 17. Id, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 530. See also supra note 46.
103 The Court's selection of the choice-of-law approach or independent approach with
respect to a specific term will rarely have substantial effects on the procedure followed thereafter by national courts. See infra text accompanying notes 120-21.
104
"[T]he objectives of the Brussels Convention. . .require in all member States a uniform application of the legal concepts and legal classifications" of the Convention. Bavaria
Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1517, 1525,
[1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 566, 578 (article 56 nevertheless does not prohibit bilateral jurisdicitonal agreements between Member States regarding judgments to which the Convention
does not apply).
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jurisdiction. 0 5
The second factor the Court considers in selecting either the choiceof-law approach or the independent approach is the degree of similarity
among Member States' laws on the point in question. 0 6 The Court has
voiced reluctance to adopt an independent approach unless the various
legal systems of the Member States treat the concept at issue similarly.' 0 7 The Court desires to avoid imposing alien interpretations of
law on the courts of Member States.' 0 8 The Court, furthermore, seeks to

preserve consistency in the national courts' interpretation and application of terms common to the Convention and domestic law.' 0 9
The third main factor the Court examines when deciding between
the independent approach and the choice-of-law approach is the role
and effects of the article at issue within the Convention. 110 The Court
often considers the role of the article in question in light of the Convention's more general provisions that would otherwise govern jurisdiction
when choosing an interpretive approach."' In selecting the independent approach to interpret the article 17 term "in writing or evidenced in
writing," for example, the Court stated that it must interpret article 17
"in the light of the effect of the conferment of jurisdiction by consent,
105

In Sociiii Bertrand, the Court used the independent approach in interpreting articles 13

and 14 to ensure uniformity among the Member States:
[I]t would not be possible to guarantee the harmonious operation of. . . the
Convention if the expression ["sale of goods on installment credit"] were
given different meanings in the various Member States. . . . It is therefore
indispensable . . . to give that expression a uniform substantive content
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1431, 1445, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 499,509 (the term "sale of
goods on installment credit" does not include a sale, payment for which is made by bills of
exchange spread over a period).
106 See, e.g., Soci~t6 Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1444-45,
[1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508-09 (noting different treatment of contract for sale on installment credit terms among Member States); Industrial Diamond Supplies v. Riva, 1977 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2175, 2187-88, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 349, 364-65 (noting different
Member State definitions of the term "ordinary appeal").
107 See, e.g., Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, 1485-86, [1977] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 26, 52-53 (differences in national laws of contract and absence of any trend towards unification mandate the choice-of-law approach to interpret the article 5(1) term
"place of performance of the [contractual] obligation'); see also Zelger v. Salinitri, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 89, 96-97, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 635, 642-43 (an agreement as to the
place of performance is sufficient to found jurisdiction in that place irrespective of article 17
form requirements).
108 See Kohler, supra note 5, at 12.
109 Id.
I1O See infia notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
ii
See, e.g., Sanders v. van der Putte, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2383, 2390-91, [1978] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 331, 342-43 (the Court must interpret in te jurisdiction under article 16
narrowly as an exception to the general jurisdictional provisions of articles 2 and 5-14);
Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1735, 1747, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 284, 300 (the Court must interpret the article 5(3)
term "place where the harmful event occurred" so that article 5(3) will not lose its effectiveness as an alternative to article 2).
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which is to exclude both the jurisdiction determined by the general principle laid down in Article 2 and the special jurisdictions provided for in
' 12
Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention."
The Court may consider factors in addition to these three in making its decisions.1 13 These are, however, the three main factors upon
which the Court has relied in past opinions when choosing between the
independent approach and the choice-of-law approach to interpret ambiguous terms in the Convention.
B.

The Court's Balancing Approach as Applied to Article 17

Although the Court has identified the three factors it considers in
selecting a method of interpretation, it has not described the interrelationship among these factors. The Court usually cites only one of these
three factors, depending on which one the term in question most directly implicates.1 14 The Court has never discussed all three factors in
one opinion, nor has it attempted to reconcile conflicting factors in a
comprehensive test.
Nevertheless, at least one commentator argues that the Court implicitly balances the three factors in selecting either the independent approach of the choice-of-law approach.' 15 The results in certain decisions
support this theory. 116 The Court has, for instance, adopted an independent interpretation of certain terms despite differences in Member
17
State law, stressing other circumstances favoring such an approach.'
Thus, to determine whether the Court will apply the independent ap112 Colzani v. RUWA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1831, 1841, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
345, 355.
113 See infia text accompanying notes 134-40.
114 See, e.g., Netherlands State v. Rfiffer, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3807, [1981] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 293 (adopting an independent interpretation of "civil and commercial
matters" to achieve the Convention purpose of uniform rules of jurisdiction); Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1517, [1980] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 566 (adopting an independent interpretation of article 56 based on the
Convention purpose of uniform rules of jurisdiction); Handelskwekerij GJ. Bier B.V. v.
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
284 (formulating an independent definition of "place where the harmful event occurred"
based on the role of article 5(3) within the Convention as a whole).
115 Kohler contends that the Court pursues a type of balancing in which the "advantages
of a uniform definition of the term" are' weighed against "the disadvantages which might
result from . . . encroach[ment] . . . on national law and [the impairment of] substantive

law." Kohler, supra note 5, at 12.
116 See, e.g., Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183, [1979] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490 (adopting an independent definition of the term "branch, agency or
other establishment"); Industrial Diamond Supplies v.. Riva, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2175, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 349 (adopting an independent definition of the term "ordinary appeal').
117 See Kohler, supra note 5, at 12; see, e.g., Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG, 1978 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2183, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490 (adopting an independent definition
of the term "branch, agency or other establishment").
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proach or the choice-of-law approach to the article 17 term "agreement," we must balance the three factors as they apply to that term.
The first factor, the policies and purposes of the Convention, requires comparison of the effect on the two purposes of the Convention of
the independent approach and the choice-of-law approach to interpreting the term "agreement.""1 " The Court has identified the two main
purposes as the avoidance of superfluous procedure and the creation of
uniform rules of Community jurisdiction.' 19
With respect to avoiding superfluous procedure, the two methods of
interpreting the term "agreement" will create identical results. Under
either approach, the Member State court before which the case was
brought would determine, using national law or independent convention law, whether the parties had reached an agreement to confer jurisdiction. Under both the independent approach and the choice-of-law
approach, the national court would either find no agreement and dismiss the action 120 or uphold the agreement and move to the merits of
the case.' 2 1 Because the procedure in national courts does not differ depending on the approach applied, the avoidance of superfluous procedure will not concern the Court of Justice in selecting one method of
interpretation over the other.
The Convention's second purpose, to create uniform jurisdictional
rules throughout the European Economic Community, however, supports adopting the independent approach to interpret the term "agreement." The Court would promote the goal of uniformity by creating
one set of requirements for agreements to confer jurisdiction that would
apply in all Member States independently of national law.
A choice-of-law interpretation of the term "agreement" under article 17 might prove especially problematic because it would require parties to consider both Convention law and national law in making
agreements conferring jurisdiction. This approach would defeat the
goal of uniformity and create unnecessary complications by requiring
the parties to consider the national law of Member States other than
their own.
In contrast, the second factor, the degree of similarity in treatment
of the term "agreement" by the Member States, 2 2 supports adoption of
the choice-of-law approach. The legal treatment of agreements varies
widely among Member States, 12 3 and the Court has expressly recog118
119

See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
120
The national court would not dismiss the action, however, despite the absence of an
agreement, if it could properly exercise jurisdiction under a separate article of the
Convention.
121
See supra note 35.
122
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
123
Laws of offer and acceptance essentially govern the legal treatment given to agree-
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The Court

Dunlop125

refused to adopt the independent approach to inin Tessili v.
terpret the term "place of performance" of contractual obligations because of the great differences of interpretation of the term among
Members States' legal systems.' 26 Given the differences in national conments by each of the various Member States. Many domestic contract laws will apply to
agreements to confer jurisdiction. Among the Member States, laws of offer and acceptance,
and other contract laws applicable to agreements to confer jurisdiction, often contain similar
concepts and principles. Differences in treatment of these concepts, however, can lead to
divergent results. A brief survey of the relevant contract law of the four largest E.E.C. members, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, illustrates divergent results. For
instance, the four legal systems define an agreement as consisting of an offer and an acceptance. Different conceptual understandings of offer and acceptance, however, lead to contrasting results.
All four states recognize the difference between an offer and an invitation to deal. See 1
R. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL
SYSTEMS 77 (1968). The factors analyzed by each state's courts, however, in determining
whether a proposal constitutes an offer or an invitation to deal, vary considerably. The courts
of Germany and Italy are, for instance, willing to consider a party's reliance on a proposal as
a factor determining an offer, while courts in France and the United Kingdom refuse to find
an offer under such circumstances, relying on tort law to compensate the injured party. Id at
347, 359-60, 370-71, 383. Where identical proposals are made to a number of parties, the
courts of France and Germany are more likely to protect the relying party than are the courts
of the United Kingdom. Id at 347, 359, 370.
Each major Member State's legal system requires an offer to be definite and to contain
the essential elements of the proposed contract. If the offer does not contain certain elements,
however, the courts of the United Kingdom and Germany appear far more willing than the
courts of France and Italy to "fill the gaps" and rule that a binding offer was actually made.
See id. at 470-71, 486-88, 511-12, 528-30.
Absent a specific statement within an offer as to whether it is revocable, the laws of the
four states establish three different approaches to determining the revocability of an offer.
The United Kingdom allows great freedom to revoke offers; German law presumes that offers
are generally irrevocable. French and Italian law allow the withdrawal of an offer, but often
provide for liability in damages. I R. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 767, 770-71, 782, 788; II K.
ZWEIGERT & H. KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 29-34 (1977); see also N.
HORN, H. KOTT. & H. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 76-77 (1982) (in Germany, express words, such as "subject to change" or "revocable,"
may protect the offeror from liability); B. NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 63-67
(1982) (discussing possible bases of offeror liability for revocation).
The four Member States treat acceptances similarly. The States differ, however, as to
how they treat acceptances after an offer has been revoked. In the United Kingdom and
France, under such circumstances no agreement is formed. K. ZWEIGART & H. KOTZ, supra,
at 29-33; see also B. NICHOLAS, supra, at 63-64 (justifying rule using a consensual theory of
contract). Under German law, unless an offer is clearly revocable, an acceptance creates a
binding agreement even following an attempted revocation. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTL, supra,
at 33-34.
If a valid offer and acceptance are found, and an actual agreement was reached, the
courts of all four states will test the agreement to ensure a certain degree of fairness to each of
the parties. Each state applies the doctrines of mistake, deceit, and duress, although the treatment of these concepts also varies. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTZ, supra, at 81-98.
124
See Kohler, supra note 5, at 12.
125
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26.
126 Tessili v. Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, 1485, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
26, 52-53; see also Effer v. Kantner, [1982] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825, 834, [1984] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 667, 674-75 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 31-38).
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tract law as to what constitutes an agreement, 127 the Court may have
similar reservations about adopting the independent approach for defining the term "agreement" under article 17.
The second factor does not, however, require the Court to adopt
the choice-of-law approach to define the term "agreement." The Court
considers the degree of similarity among Member State laws when selecting an interpretive approach in order not to encroach on domestic
law. 128 The Court generally does not consider differences in Member
State law to be a decisive factor favoring the choice-of-law approach,
however, unless the differences could create inconsistencies in individual
cases.' 29 An independent interpretation of the term "agreement" would
not lead to inconsistencies within individual cases 130 and, thus, would
not constitute a decisive encroachment on domestic law. Unlike some
other terms of a contract, 13' the term "agreement" only operates in determining jurisdiction; once the national court reaches the merits of the
claim, it need not interpret the term again under domestic law. With
the threat of infringement on Member State law weakened by this consideration, the Convention's goal of creating uniform jurisdictional rules
weighs heavily in favor of the independent approach.
The final factor, the role of article 17 within the Convention as a
whole, however, weighs in favor of the choice-of-law approach to interpret the term "agreement." Article 17 is designed to provide parties
with an alternative to the fori established by the Convention's more general provisions. The purpose of article 17 within the Convention is twofold: to allow parties to select the courts on which they wish to confer
jurisdiction, and to provide minimum safeguards to ensure that both
parties have actually consented to such an agreement.132 Thus, viewed
from the perspective of the Convention as a whole, the Convention's
127
128

129

See supra note 123.
See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Industrial Diamond Supplies v. Riva, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2175,

[1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 349 (adopting an independent definition of "ordinary appeal" in
articles 30 and 38 despite differences in Member State law); see also LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 88 (adopting an independent definition of the term "civil and commercial matters" in
article 1). In one case, the Court actually cited differences in Member State law as a reason
for adopting an independent approach, although it also based its decision on the necessity of
a uniform definition in order to "guarantee the harmonious operation" of the Convention.
Soci&6t Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1431, 1445, [1978] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 499, 509.
130 An independent approach to the interpretation of article 17 would not create inconsistencies within particular cases because the national court would interpret a clause conferring jurisdiction only under Convention law, and the remainder of the contract only under
national substantive law.
131
For example, the clause designating the place of performance of the obligation is
often relevant both to determining jurisdiction and the merits of the dispute.
132
"Article 17 is thus intended to lay down itself the formal requirements which agreements conferring jurisdiction must meet; the purpose is to ensure legal certainty and that the
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drafters did not intend article 17 to set forth all of the various requirements for an "agreement." This serves to distinguish the problem of
defining the requirements for an agreement from the Court's past article
17 decisions interpreting formal requirements, which fell directly within
the purposes of article 17.133 It would thus appear that article 17's
drafters did not wish the Court to establish independent law governing
the term "agreement" for purposes of jurisdiction. Lacking a basis in
the purposes of article 17, the Court should favor a choice-of-law approach unless other factors clearly necessitate an independent interpretation of the term "agreement."
In sum, a balancing of the three factors produces ambiguous results. The Convention's goal of creating uniform jurisdictional rules
strongly supports the independent approach, but the dissimilarity of
Member State law and the limited purposes of article 17 provide support for a choice-of-law approach. Because of the importance of the
goal of creating uniform rules ofjurisdiction, the independent approach
appears preferable, but the closeness of the balance precludes any definitive conclusions. Because a balancing of the factors previously identified
by the Court is not decisive, other factors, not previously recognized by
the Court, could prove important.
C.

Authority and Practicality Concerns

Two additional factors, not previously addressed by the Court, are
particularly relevant to interpreting the term "agreement": the limited
authority of the Court to create new law 134 and the practicality of each
interpretive approach. 135

The European Court of Justice is a court of limited authority. The
Court has authority to interpret ambiguous terms and clauses in the
Convention; it does not, however, have authority to judicially create
bodies of law in the manner of a common law court.' 36 The dividing
line between merely interpreting the term "agreement" in article 17 and
creating an independent body of law defining the requirements of and
defenses to an agreement is unclear. 137 At least one Court official beparties have given their consent." Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1671, 1688, [1982] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 21.
133 See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
134 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
135 See infa paragraph accompanying note 140.
136 The Court has authority to "give rulings on the interpretation of the Convention."
Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of September 27,
1968, on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
supra note 4, 1 6082.
137 Two recent decisions illustrate that the Court must resolve problems the Convention
does not anticipate. In Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 987, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 605, the
Court ruled that the article 5(1) term "matters relating to a contract" includes obligations
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lieves that the Court lacks the power to create an independent definition
of the term "agreement." 1 38 The purpose of article 17 is not to set forth
an independent law of agreements, but only to establish certain procedural safeguards for parties entering into agreements to confer jurisdiction. 139 Thus, unless the Court has strong reasons favoring the creation
of an independent definition of the term "agreement," it should avoid
the risk of exceeding its authority and use the choice-of-law approach to
interpret the term.
The Court should also weigh the practical implications associated
with each approach before making its choice. A choice-of-law approach
would operate under the control of national courts and would be based
on existing national substantive law. Under the choice-of-law approach,
the national court before which the case was brought would apply the
law of the Member State named in the writing to determine whether the
writing constituted a valid agreement.1 40 An independent interpretation would, however, require the Court to adopt a common law approach and define all the substantive requirements for a valid
agreement, together with the possible defenses, on a case by case basis.
Adoption of the independent approach would thus involve the Court in
arising out of the relationship between an association and its members. In Gerling Konzern
Speziale Kreditversicherungs AG v. Amministrazione Del Tesoro dello Stato, 1983 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2503, 2517, the Court ruled that the article 17 requirement of a writing does not
apply to the third party beneficiary of an insurance contract, so long as the two contracting
parties fulfilled the requirement.
In each of these decisions, the Court demonstrated a willingness to rely on the policies
underlying the articles in question to resolve issues the Convention did not address. In Gerling
Konrem the Court dealt with issues of contract law not included in the Convention. The
Court has thus indicated that it will define the scope of the article 17 writing requirement in a
series of individual decisions.
A major difference exists, however, between defining the scope of a term as carefully
defined as the requirement of a writing and defining a term as ambiguous as "agreement."
The Convention's language and purposes provide more guidance for defining the scope of
specific articles than for defining the term "agreement." Defining the term agreement would
require a much longer series of decisions. Most important, an independent definition of
agreement would conflict with the established law of individual Member States. Thus, although the Court has not always refused to create law, it has never strayed so far from the
Convention into the realm of creating common law as it would in attempting to create an
independent definition of the term "agreement."
138 Sir Gordon Slynn has expressed doubts as to whether the Court has authority under
the Convention to create, in a common law fashion, an independent definition of a term as
complex and as rooted in the individual domestic legal systems of the Member States as the
term "agreement." Interview with Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in Ithaca, New York (Sept. 9, 1983).
139 See supra notes 83-95, 132 and accompanying text.
140 This is not the only possible choice-of-law rule that would work, but it appears to be
the method most likely to uphold the purposes of article 17. See Opinion of Sir Gordon
Slynn, Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671, 1697-99, [1982] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 14-15 (considering and rejecting the possibility of following either the
national law of the forum in which the proceeding was brought, or that forum's private international law).
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a long and complex exercise. The Court could no doubt create an in-

dependent definition of "agreement" but only at the cost of much effort,
an increase in its backlog of cases pending, and the diversion of attention from other issues.
D.

Summary of Factors Considered by the Court

It appears that arguments for procedural uniformity within the European Economic Community, when balanced against the interest of
uniformity within national legal systems and article 17's purposes within
the Convention as a whole, slightly favor the creation of an independent
definition of the term "agreement." These arguments are counterbalanced, however, by concerns that the Court lacks the authority to create
an independent definition of the term "agreement." 1 4 1 An attempt by
the Court to create a universal concept of agreement would also involve
serious practical difficulties. Because the Court has never addressed
these latter two concerns, nor explained its balancing approach, it is
impossible to predict how the Court will resolve these conflicting factors.
The path the Court chooses to take will depend on the Court's evaluations of each of the factors in the balance, and in particular, the relative
importance it attaches to the creation of uniform jurisdictional rules.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decisions interpreting article 17 have so far addressed
only the formal requirements of an agreement conferring jurisdiction. 142
The Court has not established the approach it will use to promulgate
the substantive requirements of such agreements. Although the Court
has adopted the independent approach to interpret article 17's requirements of form, it is unclear whether the Court will use the same approach to interpret article 17's substantive requirements. Recent
decisions show the Court's continued willingness to use the choice-of-law
approach. 143 The factors the Court relies on in selecting the interpretive
approach it will use for a particular term indicate that the Court has
ample grounds to adopt the choice-of-law approach to interpret the
term "agreement."
The Court has not provided sufficient explanation of the factors it
analyzes in selecting a method of interpretation, and the manner in
which it balances these factors, to support authoritative predictions of
which method the Court will adopt to interpret the term "agreement."
Certain conclusions, however, may be drawn.
The Court could find support for the selection of either the inSee supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
143
See, e.g., Effer v. Kantner, [1982] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 667 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 31-38).
141

142
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dependent approach or the choice-of-law approach in the principles
governing earlier decisions. Consistency with the Convention's general
aim to create uniform jurisdictional rules may prompt the Court to select the independent approach. Although consistent with the goal of
uniformity, the independent approach might fall outside the purposes of
article 17 by involving the Court in an elaborate and unprecedented
exercise of defining a broad, fundamental term of law on a case by case
basis. Although the Court may stress the goal of creating uniform jurisdictional rules and adopt an independent interpretation, it should recognize the full implications of such an approach before selecting it as a
solution to the problem of defining the term "agreement" under article
17 of the Convention on Jurisdiction.
Geofey D. Oliver

